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orohippus, with four complete toes on the fore-foot. And finally, in the lower Eocene, we get the eohippus, which shows the rudiment of a fifth toe on the front and of a fourth toe on the hind foot. In the structure of the teeth — the other chief point in which the modern horse is notably specialized — we find a similar gradation back to the ordinary mammalian type.

The agreement of observed facts with the requirements of theory is here complete, minute, and specific; and Professor Huxley may well say that the history of the descent of the horse from a five-toed mammal, as thus demonstrated, supplies all that was required to complete the proof of the Darwinian theory. The theory not only alleges a *vera causa*, and is not only confirmed by the unanimous import of the facts of classification, embryology, morphology, distribution, and succession; but it has further succeeded in tracing the actual origination of one generic type from another, through gradual "descent with modifications." And thus, within a score of years from its first announcement, the daring hypothesis of Mr. Darwin may fairly claim to be regarded as one of the established truths of science.

JOHN FISKE.

ART. VI. — THE EASTERN QUESTION.

THE title of this article is the name of the oldest existing problem in European politics. All the questions with which the diplomatists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were plagued, except this, have been settled in one fashion or another; but this remains, and is now apparently more difficult than when it first presented itself. The humiliation of the House of Austria, which was the aim of Continental reformers at the close of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century; the humiliation of France, which was their aim during the latter part of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century; and the reduction of the Pope to a condition of harmlessness, which has been one of their dreams for fully three centuries, have all been accomplished. Indeed, if we look at the points of the Grand Design of Henry the Fourth, as set forth by Sully to Queen Elizabeth, — "the restoration of Germany to its ancient liberty

in respect to the election of its Emperors and the nomination of a king of the Romans"; the independence of the United Provinces; the independence of Switzerland; "the division of all Christendom into a certain number of powers as equal as may be," and "the reduction of the various religions in it to those three which should appear to be most numerous and considerable in Europe," and which were all to enjoy toleration,—we are struck with the prophetic character of the scheme. Part of it, and not the least important, was the strengthening of the kingdoms of Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland, for the purpose of increasing their efficiency in the struggle with the Turks and Tartars in which those countries had for many generations been engaged, and of this a striking reminiscence may be found in Bismarck's desire to build Austria up on the Slavonic side, as the power best qualified and most surely destined to perform the work of civilization in Southeastern Europe.

But Henry did not confine himself to the settlement of Christendom. One of his leading friends and companions in arms, La Noue, drew up a plan for the overthrow of the Turkish Empire, which was to be carried out by the new league of the Christian powers; and from that time down to the fall of the monarchy, in 1792, the idea of a great movement against the Turks, in which France was to take the lead, was never wholly absent from French politics. In the East, Austria no less than Russia was engaged in the almost incessant war with the Ottomans, who in 1682 were on the point of capturing Vienna. Indeed, the tremendous pressure with which the Eastern Question forced itself on the attention of Continental Europe, from the capture of Adrianople in 1360 down to the Turco-Austrian Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, may be called one of the capital facts in modern history. When one considers what that pressure meant, one can hardly help feeling surprised that civilization along the eastern frontier of Christendom did not suffer from it incurably. It meant incessant though not formal war, and war in which quarter was neither given nor expected, and of which the capture of women and children and the pillage or burning of villages were leading incidents, along a line extending, with occasional variations and intermissions, from the Caspian to the North Sea, and then running through Poland and Hungary and Dalmatia to the Adriatic. Along the eastern portion of it the Tartars for a period of several centuries made annual, and

for a time semiannual, incursions, in which they carried devastation into Russia, Poland, and Hungary, the rapidity of the march, even of their indefatigable light cavalry, being greatly increased by their practice of driving with them herds of horses which they both fed on and used as remounts. They filled the lives of Christian tillers of the soil through all that vast region with a bitterness and uncertainty which in our day have been known in no part of the civilized or even semi-civilized world except the northern frontier of Persia before the late Russian conquests. On the Turkish border, from the Danube to the Adriatic there was probably no real peace for a month at a time from the middle of the fifteenth down to the close of the last century, owing to the incessant raiding of the border begs. The Ottoman terror was carried still farther west, and into more civilized regions, when the famous pirate Barbarossa, in 1520, converted Tunis and Algiers and Tripoli into piratical Mussulman states, which, until within the memory of men now living, ravaged the coasts of Italy, France, and Spain, and carried off men and women into hopeless slavery, from peaceful homes, in the very heart of Christendom, and made a voyage in the Mediterranean, and even the Bay of Biscay, an adventurous undertaking. Any one who wishes to get an idea of the *cowed* condition to which three centuries of Mussulman aggressions had reduced Christian powers can hardly do better than read the history of the demands of these Barbary States on the United States from 1785 to 1805, and of the attack of Lord Exmouth on Algiers in 1816, when he released two thousand eight hundred and seventy-five Christians from captivity, mostly Frenchmen and Italians, who had been seized in their fields and homes in Sardinia, Naples, and Provence, and sold into slavery in the interior. And yet this was only the close of a chapter of horrors nearly three centuries long, and these corsairs were but the western outposts of a system of organized oppression, which covered the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and stretched back to the frontier of Persia. In fact, it is probably no exaggeration to say that no single tributary to the great sea of human misery has equalled in depth and duration that which has flowed from the contact of Islam with Christianity in Europe. Of all the political terrors by which the human imagination has been oppressed, probably not one has clouded the future of so many persons of all ages and sexes as the fear of Mussulman conquest or invasion.

The dread of the Ottoman Empire as a menace to Christendom has declined rapidly since the siege of Vienna, which proved that its aggressive power was gone, and that it was falling behind Europe in the military art. Its subsequent successes in the field, — and it has had many, — both against the Austrians and Russians, were achieved on the defensive and behind its own frontier. Interest in Turkey, as well as fear of it, on the part of the Western powers may be said to have much diminished or died out during the eighteenth century. It was only revived by the Greek insurrection, in which the atrocities of the Turks excited general horror, though probably few remembered that the methods of warfare to which they resorted in that case were precisely those which they had employed in suppressing Christian revolts in nearly every other province of the European Empire, and notably in Servia during the risings in 1804 and 1815. Indeed, the massacres perpetrated by the Dahis, or Mussulman landholders, in that province surpassed in ferocity and deliberation anything of which the Turks have since been guilty, and included the assassination of every Servian of distinction who could be laid hold of. There was undoubtedly no portion of the old Turkish Empire which suffered more from Turkish domination than it did, as it formed the borderland through which Turkish armies passed in the long wars with Austria, and in the latter days of the Janissaries the passage of one of these armies involved for the rayahs every species of horror. But Servia lay far out of the track of Western travel or observation. Down to the introduction of steamboats on the Danube, it was to Western Europe, as were Bosnia and Herzegovina, an unknown land, the whereabouts of which even most educated persons would have found it difficult to fix with an approach to accuracy. The Servian Christians too, like the other Slavonic subjects of the Porte, had no sentimental hold on the Western imagination, such as that which gave the Greek rising in 1821 so much pathos and dignity. The Slaves had no history that scholars and poets knew or cared for, and the miserable tale of their successful or unsuccessful heroism and endurance only reached France and England in stray scraps of old news, such as we have been receiving for the last ten years about the contests of Yacoub Beg with the Chinese in Eastern Tartary.

The horror and indignation excited in the Christian world by

such incidents as the massacre of Scio, were in some degree kept down by the scantiness of the information which in that day was to be had about any distant events, and by the bluntness which the long war of the French Revolution, from which Europe had just emerged, had given to popular susceptibilities. The generation which read of this, and of Ibrahim Pasha's operations in the Morea, had seen too much misery to be deeply stirred by the woes of these far-off islanders, and it is questionable whether, if the Philhellenes had not managed to connect in the popular imagination the followers of Marcos Bozzaris and Karais Kaki with Leonidas and Miltiades by ties of consanguinity, the mere claims of humanity would not have been overridden by the caution and misgivings of the politicians, which led the Duke of Wellington's ministry to pronounce through the King's speech the battle of Navarino an "untoward event," though it made Greek independence certain. Indeed, Turkey had nothing more formidable to fear in Christian sentiment than the fanatical sympathy of the Russians with their ecclesiastical brethren. The "enthusiasm of humanity" had not begun to show itself in politics. What pitiful interest was roused by the struggle of the Greeks was satisfied by the achievement of their independence, and it died out rapidly under the lame attempts of the new nation at self-government, and especially by its total failure, and indeed avowed unwillingness, to pay its debts. It got a bad name in the money-market, which is perhaps the worst place in which a community can lose its reputation, and the spectacle of its failures and shortcomings, by a natural and familiar process, helped to rehabilitate the Turks, or at all events cause a revision of the hostile judgment which had been passed upon them, and, after the partially successful invasion of the Russians in 1829, secured them twenty years of peace and not undignified security. During this period the revolution in Egypt, the quarrel between England and France which grew out of it, and above all the rapid increase of the British Empire in India, ending with the annexation of the Punjaub after the Sikh invasion in 1846, gave communication with India an importance in English politics which it had not before possessed, and created that jealousy of any interference with Turkey which, under Lord Palmerston's fostering hand, grew into a fundamental portion of English foreign policy. To keep

Constantinople in the hands of a weak and unaggressive power was set down as essential to the preservation of English supremacy in the East.

The idea was strengthened and solidified in 1849 – 50 by one of those pieces of good luck which have often befallen Turkey, and to which she may be said to owe her existence. After twenty-five years of obscurity she suddenly reappeared on the stage of European politics before the eyes of excited liberals of the West, in the attitude of a defender of the oppressed. Russia and Austria had done her the very great service of making an unjustifiable demand on her for the surrender of the Hungarian and Polish refugees, and her firm refusal took the enthusiastic Christian public by storm. She became suddenly glorified as one of the defenders of freedom, and the refuge of the oppressed, and the curious and hearty moral support which she received from English and French liberals, when again assailed by Russia in 1853, was thus prepared. Strange as that support appears at this distance of time and in the light of recent events, no one will find much difficulty in understanding it who can recall the bitter disappointment which settled down on the friends of constitutional government after the failure of 1848 – 49, and the joy and gratitude with which the resistance of Turkey to the two great absolutist powers was received, in the midst of what appeared to be the general collapse of liberalism, — for even republican France had just captured Rome for the Pope. It was doubtless absurd to those who knew anything of the secret springs of Turkish policy, or of the nature of Turkish rule, but it was sincere, and not unnatural, and it doubtless saved Turkey. In the war of 1853 it gave her not only the aid of fleets and armies, but the moral force of a great cause. When the English and French papers called her the “defender of civilization against barbarism,” it drew forth in the Christian homes of the West, not smiles of ridicule, but tears of honest sympathy and admiration, and this sympathy and admiration soon proved to have a pecuniary value. After the peace, there was a general disposition to help the honest fellow who had so manfully withstood the Russian bear. There was no longer any hesitation in doing what had never been thought of before, — admitting Turkey to the circle of civilized nations, and there was so much confidence in her reforming zeal that she had no difficulty in doing what she had never done before,

— borrowing enormous sums in France and England, although there was not a road in the Empire on which a spring carriage could make a day's journey, not a judge to whom a European would agree to submit the simplest controversy, and hardly an official who was not suspected of corruption or malversation, and although the monarch was a worn-out debauchee.

The money was used in a perfectly characteristic way, — in the way, in short, in which Turkish revenues have been used ever since the fall of Constantinople, — that is, for the luxury of the court and the equipment of fleets and armies. For four hundred years nearly every dollar that has reached the capital from the tax-payers has gone, it is hardly an exaggeration to say, in one of these two ways. No new buildings — or at least none to which the epithet monumental could be applied — have been erected; no roads have been made, or aqueducts built, or docks or wharves constructed, or channels cleared, or colleges or charities founded. There has been some expenditure on mosques, but none of late, and the most splendid of the Mussulman temples in European Turkey — one of the two which possess any claims to architectural beauty — is a legacy from the Greek Empire. Nor has there been recently any sign of a birth or revival of civilizing energy among the ruling race. No Turk had in 1853 or has since given any evidence of a share in that passion for change or improvement which has within the last century transformed the Christian world. There is neither in the capital nor in the provinces any evidence among Turkish youth of interest in the progress of Western thought or discovery, or desire to share in the toils and triumphs and pleasures of Western science or literature or art. There is to be found among the *softas*, or young theologians who come up to Constantinople to pursue their studies, a good deal of religious zeal, and a capacity for self-denial which the most ascetic Christians might envy; but their intellectual as well as moral force seems to spend itself in a sort of fierce contemplation of the central dogma — in fact, one may say the only dogma — of the Mahometan faith, the oneness of God and the authenticity of the Prophet. To believe this, to believe it with passionate certainty, to be ready to proclaim it through fire and blood, and to be capable of overmastering rage over any denial or doubt of it, are the ambition of the only portion of the Mussulman youth which seeks to rise above that enjoyment of the good

things of this life which they believe to be the true believer's right. The good things of this life, too, is a phrase to which a young Turk would give none of the extended significance which it would receive from a Western sensualist, for it would cover none of the pleasures of taste or imagination. The sum of Ottoman happiness is, in fact, expressed in a proverb which will not bear literal translation, but which finds ample and sufficient materials for the wise man's content in a well-stocked harem, a well-filled stable, and a cook who knows his business. Nor is this careful and haughty withdrawal from the stream of Western progress peculiar to the Mussulman of Turkey. Mr. Hunter, in his work on the "Indian Mussulmans," tells a story which throws a flood of light on the present condition and future prosperity of their brethren in Europe. The British found the Mussulmans in India occupying a position strictly corresponding to that of the Turks in Turkey. They were the political rulers and great land-holders of the country. They officered the army and filled the civil service in every branch. They were the judges, and while administering the law were above the law. All the offices of state which were worth having fell to their share. With the advent of the conqueror came the throwing open to all natives of the country of whatever creed such offices as were open to any natives, and of course they naturally fell to the best qualified or equipped. The English found the Mussulmans in full possession of the judicial bench, and for half a century kept them there as assessors of the English judges. Now they have completely given way to Hindoos, because Hindoos only will take the trouble to acquire the necessary linguistic and other learning, and so on all through the service. "Even ten years ago," says Mr. Hunter in 1872, "the Mussulmans managed to transmit the post of Nazir — or Chief of the revenue bailiffs — to men of their own creed; but now one or two unpopular appointments about the jail are the most the former masters of India can hope for. The staff of clerks attached to the various offices, the responsible posts in the courts, and even the higher offices in the police are recruited from the pushing Hindu youth of the government school." Out of 2,111 offices in the gift of the government in the province of Bengal, 1,338 are filled by Europeans, 681 by Hindoos, and only 92 by Mussulmans. Turning to the pleaders of the high court, we find that in the beginning of the century they were all Mussulmans; in 1851 the

Mussulmans were as numerous as the Hindoos and English put together; but of the 240 natives admitted to practice since then 239 were Hindoos and only one a Mussulman. The medical profession tells the same story. The Mussulman will not learn the modern medicine, and there are now no Mussulman doctors in India, except barber surgeons, while good Hindoo doctors graduate in considerable numbers from the Calcutta University. "The government," adds Mr. Hunter, "has covered Bengal with schools, and many of its districts are peopled with Mohammedans. Government schools fail to develop a class of Mussulmans who can compete successfully at the Universities, or find an entrance into any of the professions. The same schools send forth every year a vast body of well-read, ambitious, and intellectual Hindu youths, who distinguish themselves as young men at the universities, and in after life monopolize every avenue to wealth or distinction. The truth is, our system of public instruction which has awakened the Hindus from the sleep of centuries, and quickened their inert masses with some of the noble impulses of a nation, is opposed to the traditions, unsuited to the requirements, and hateful to the religion of the Mussulmans."

Mr. Hunter's account of the Mohammedan College founded by Warren Hastings to enable the Mussulmans to qualify themselves for retaining their old place in the administration, is most interesting, but too long for quotation. Suffice it to say, that, having been left in Mohammedan hands, the studies in it are confined almost exclusively to the two sacred languages, Arabic and Persian, and to the Mohammedan law, and it turns out a set of utterly ignorant, vicious, and fanatical young men unfit for any modern career. The chapter on Holy War against the Infidel has been for ninety years the favorite study of the place, and down to 1868 examination questions were given in it. An English resident professor was smuggled in some years ago with difficulty, so intense is their hatred of the infidel. Going his rounds one night, he had to quell a tumult in a student's room arising out of the question whether prayer uttered without having the heels joined had any efficacy. When he tried to introduce profane science, they pelted him with brickbats and rotten mangoes.

What the friends of the Turks expected in 1855 was that they would themselves undertake in Turkey that very political and social revolution which the English have brought about with the strong

hand in India, that is, that the members of the ruling faith would divest themselves of their privileges and throw open all branches of the public administration to men of all creeds and races, and not only this, but submit themselves to the same process of training, and the same proportion of the public burdens, and the same impediments and disabilities of whatsoever nature. Nay, more, that they would substitute for the traditional Mahomedan idea of the state, that is, a theocracy resting on the sabre, the modern European idea of an association of equals, engaged in the pursuit of happiness, under purely secular bonds, and with secular tests and standards; or, in other words, would bring about a state of things which the law binds all true Mussulmans to prevent, even at the cost of their lives, — the conversion of the country of Islam into an enemy's country by setting up a government which should treat the religion of the Prophet as of no more political account than any other. There are forty millions of Mussulmans in British India, or nearly three times as many as in Turkey, and the experiment of transforming them into modern men, has been tried there, it is safe to say, under conditions more favorable than are ever likely to present themselves anywhere else. They are ready to endure poverty, social humiliation, and total political abnegation sooner than submit to it, even at the hands of a partial and fostering government. Would not this example be sufficient to suppress all strong hope with regard to the Turks, even if they too had undergone no trial? But they have undergone a trial. Ever since 1839 the Sultans have been endeavoring, if possible, to infuse new strength into the Empire, the decline of which, as compared with the Western powers, has been only too manifest, by decreeing certain assimilations of the political constitution to those of European states; but as a matter of fact not one of them has had any perceptible force outside of Constantinople, except the abolition of the feudal sway of the old begs, which, however, was carried out, not in the interest of the Christian vassals, but as a means of preventing the incessant revolts by which the government began to be harassed from the close of the last century, and at the same time of bringing the administration at Constantinople into closer relations with the tax-paying class, out of whom the revenue was to be squeezed. It is now nearly forty years since the issue of the Khatti-sheriff of Gulhane, the first of

the reformatory decrees, and testimony of the strongest kind has been steadily pouring in ever since, and is now astonishing Europe, that the condition of the Christian population has undergone little amelioration during that period through Turkish legislation or administration ; and that all or nearly all the improvement which has been effected in it has been the result of the intrusion of European opinion through the consuls. To all the reformatory measures issuing from Constantinople, and which the government itself had no direct fiscal interest in carrying out, the Mussulman population of the interior have opposed a steady and completely effective resistance.

When we begin to inquire into the nature of the Mussulman resistance to these measures, and the reason why it has been effective, we are met at the outset by the puzzling fact that the population of European Turkey — and it is with this that we are mainly concerned in the present article — amounted in 1866, according to the Turkish Ministry of Finance (but Turkish census returns are only approximative), to twelve million, of all creeds and races, and of those little more than three million are Mussulmans. How is it that so small a body of men, not forming a military organization, not acting or prepared to act in concert, scattered over the country in towns and villages like the others, are able to impose on this enormous majority, and maintain a régime of crushing oppression and inequality ? Why does this majority need to be looked after by foreign consuls, and to be made the subject of periodical intervention by foreign powers, in order to be secured in the enjoyment of the commonest human rights ? The domination of the Mussulmans is not upheld by troops, for the Turkish army on the peace footing is small, and is mostly posted along the frontier of a vast empire. Nor is it upheld by superiority of wealth, or intelligence, or energy. The Christians are richer, better educated, and more enterprising. Any attempt to answer these questions brings us to the central difficulty of the Eastern question, and the more one examines it, the more one is struck with the analogy between the task which the great powers have set themselves with regard to the Christian population, and that which our government has set itself with regard to the negroes of the South, and the more one is impressed with the prominence of the part which moral qualities, or what

we may call character, as distinguished from knowledge or intellectual light, plays in the successful working of any political system however simple. The Turkish Constitution as it stood, under the general name of the *Tanzimât*, even before the latest change, really provided the Christians with ample legal protection for their social rights, and for a large share in the government of the Empire. The *Khatti-Hamayoun* issued at the close of the Crimean War, as the Turkish share in the settlement consecrated by the Peace of Paris, gave them representation in the local councils, the right to serve in the army, and to have their testimony received against Mussulmans before the courts; and of all this the treaty took favorable notice, as a new departure on the part of Turkey. Nevertheless, it is universally admitted that it has wrought no perceptible change in the condition of the Christians. In fact, it would be difficult to point to a single striking result of the *Tanzimât*, since the issue of the *Khatti-sheriff* of *Gulhane* in 1839, except the destruction of the feudal position of the country begs, and the more direct subjection of the tax-payers to the administration at Constantinople. The reason of this practical failure of reform is to be found in the character of the Christian population, no less than in that of the Turks, and there could hardly be a more valuable illustration than this failure affords of the difficulty of making any valuable political change where the bulk of the people are wanting in the courage, ambition, and self-confidence needed to carry it out.

The concessions of the Ottoman government to its Christian subjects have amounted to nothing, first, because the official class at Constantinople, which really made them, and which is the class with which European diplomatists deal, does not represent and is not in real harmony with the Mussulman population of the interior, and is utterly unable to impose its will upon it; and secondly, because four centuries of oppression have so broken the spirit of the Christians, and destroyed their combativeness, that they are incapable of using their legal rights as against the conquering race. Language of this sort is used at the West to describe the state of mind of communities which do not care enough for self-government, or what we call political liberty, to be willing to fight for it, or offer organized resistance to official usurpation. It will consequently fail to give an adequate idea of the

state of things in Turkey without the further explanation that the Turkish Christian stands in *bodily fear* of his Turkish neighbor, very much as a slave does of his master, and does not think of opposition to him as among the possibilities of his social existence. Every traveller in the interior of Turkey must have seen illustrations of this. A Turkish youth will ride alone into a Christian village, quarter himself in its best house, order everything attainable for his personal use, convert every man and woman he sets eyes on into his attendants for the time being, load them with abuse, and hear nothing in reply but appeals for mercy and forbearance. We were once present at a trial of three boys, in a town on the Lower Danube, for robbing the head man of a neighboring Christian village, the proceedings having been set on foot by the British Consul. The eldest of the culprits was not fifteen, and the confession of the other two brought out the fact, that, being in search of amusement one fine morning, they adopted the suggestion of the leader, and went out on the highway, in the country, to rob a *giaour*. The first who presented himself was this *tchurbadji*, who was on horseback and was bringing in the village tax, which amounted to a considerable sum (for those parts). They seized his bridle-rein, ordered him to dismount, which he did, and they then rifled his pockets or bag without meeting with the slightest resistance, and yet he was a tall and powerful man, not over fifty. Probably few persons, too, have ever been long in the interior without seeing an able-bodied Christian receive a thrashing, with a stick or whip, from a Turk, to which he submitted without any nearer approach to revolt than holding up his arms for shelter. The explanation of this is that for centuries the Turks have carried arms, which the Christians are forbidden to do, and have used them without hesitation, and with the full certainty that the murder or maiming or spoliation of an infidel would have no legal consequences. In fact, so certain has it been for many generations that resistance to a Turk would end in assassination, and perhaps the ruin of a man's whole family, that not only has the habit of self-defence died out, but the very instinct itself seems to be wellnigh extinct among the subject population. The richest and most prosperous Christian of a village or country town, finding himself in the presence of a company of Turks, loses his courage and self-respect, is silent,

abashed, and timid, and finds discussion with them impossible, and mere expression of opinion a thing to be dreaded and avoided.

The present writer was travelling many years ago in Roumelia with a European General in the Turkish service, who was waited upon, on arriving late in the evening, by the family of one of ten Christians, from whom the Turkish Mudir had demanded a loan, and had shut up in prison, pending the production of the money. The General went at once to the functionary and fiercely demanded their release, which was promptly accorded, but there was not the slightest sign of resentment among the captives. To be allowed to get quietly back to their homes, to have no fuss made about them, and above all to have no complaint made in their behalf at Constantinople against the local tyrant, were all they asked. They were profuse and even lachrymose in their expressions of gratitude, but there was not the slightest sign of the manly wrath or vindictiveness without which, after all, no statutory defences of personal liberty are worth the paper on which they are written. They were, in short, for all practical purposes in the mental and moral condition of mediæval Jews, and had evidently no thought of any better mode of protecting life or property against lawlessness or oppression than flight, concealment, or bribery.

But the Christian timidity and self-distrust, though more remarkable, contribute no more to the difficulty of the Eastern problem than the pride and self-confidence of the Turk; nor are these by any means greater than facts seem to justify. It has to be remembered, in the first place, that self-respect and self-exaltation occupy fully as prominent a place in the Mohammedan faith as humility and self-abasement in the Christian, and in this the Mohammedan allies itself with the strongest of human instincts. The followers of the Prophet began by looking on the whole earth as their legitimate prey, and the sabre as the best and noblest instrument for the propagation of their creed, and as they spread it they added military to spiritual arrogance, — a combination of perhaps unequalled efficiency in narrowing the range of one's sympathy and giving zest to conquest and spoliation. The Mussulmans were humble enough before God, but then their God was the God of a chosen people, "compassionate and merciful," but only for believers, and their religion was so superior in simplicity and purity

to all the creeds they came across in their migrations, that the very worship of such a Deity fostered a magnificent insolence for which the world has never yet produced a parallel, and which their political and military experience for several centuries seemed to warrant. Even the Ottomans, though far inferior to the Arabs, encountered no races in their earlier advances over which they could not fairly claim either intellectual or moral superiority. In Europe they had to contend only with a worse barbarism than their own, or a civilization which any barbarian might well despise, and for two centuries after the fall of Constantinople they maintained their superiority to the Christian powers in the military art, which was then the art of arts. They were better artillerymen; and they were the first to raise and maintain in a high state of discipline and efficiency a large standing army. They were the first to attain high excellence in what military writers call "logistics," or the art of moving and supplying large bodies of troops. Their attacks owed most of their terror in the earlier days of their European history to the then astounding swiftness of their marches. In the graphic description given by Froissart of the battle of Nicopoli there is nothing he dwells on with so much emphasis as the secrecy with which Bajazet crossed the Hellespont with two hundred thousand men, and the rapidity with which he reached the Danube. "The Christians," he says, "were not only ignorant of their numbers, but of their approach. They advanced so secretly that they were close to Nicopoli before the besiegers knew of their having begun their march." No Christian power at that day could move a force of quarter the size half the distance, and all accounts agree that a Turkish army of that day was, as it is to-day, a sober and somewhat austere body. The history of the Ottomans for the last two hundred years has, it is true, been the record of decline, but the possible effects of the loss of military supremacy have been more than counterbalanced by their continued political success. In our eyes their government has been a horrible failure; judged by their own standard, there is everything in it to be proud of. The Turk's notion of success in politics makes it consist in holding as large a body of infidels and as wide range of territory as possible in complete subjection for the benefit of the Mussulman caste, and seeing to it that the members of this caste have the best the country affords in meat, drink, and clothing, and

as few anxieties, dangers, or tribulations as circumstances will allow. This work, there is no doubt, the Ottomans have done, and done it well. They have managed to rule four times their own number, and not mildly or laboriously or conscientiously, but with a rod of iron, and with utter indifference to all the responsibilities usually associated with the possession of power. This is not an admirable feat in the eyes of the Christian statesman, but it is a great display of capacity for command, perhaps the greatest the world has ever seen; and the lustre of the exploit from this point of view is not dimmed by the atrocities of some of their processes. This, according to our notions, ought to have made their sway intolerable and hastened their downfall; as a matter of fact, it strengthened their sway and postponed their downfall. Without the cruelty and ferocity no government as bad as theirs could possibly have lasted so long.

This pride of theirs and sense of superiority have had an effect on their manners, which curiously enough has done a good deal to conciliate European opinion, and thus secure not only tolerance, but a certain amount of support for their system. Socially the members of a conquering and slaveholding class are almost sure to be pleasant fellows; that is, they are almost sure to have the ease, the dignity, the self-respecting reserve, and the truthfulness which form so large a part of what in an aristocratic society is called a gentleman. The addition of *general* kindness, humanity, and unselfishness, which is usually made in democratic definitions of the character, does not, strictly speaking, belong to it. A gentleman proper has little sympathy except for gentlemen, and looks on the rest of the community as in a large degree intended to make the world a pleasant place for gentlemen to live in. In the original sense of the term, the Turk is a thorough gentleman, and social intercourse with him forms to travelling foreigners a delightful contrast to social intercourse with any of the Christian races who live under him. One may go down to the lowest stratum of Turkish society — the poor Anatolian peasant living with his family in his one room, and extracting a scanty subsistence from a few acres with an antique plough — without finding any marked diminution in dignity. His manners will show none of the usual traces of poverty. You will never meet with in the Turk the fussy or fawning subserviency, and the eager persistence in flat-

tery and devotion, which are so apt to give the Christians of whatever race the air of "drummers" trying to sell you "a bill of goods." In trade, too, he is not enterprising, but he is honest as the sun. It is rare, indeed, for a Turk to misrepresent his goods, or even to urge you to buy, and rarer still for a Turkish merchant to be unable to pay his debts. As an artisan, he was, while he flourished, famed for honest work, but, as a general rule, he is being rapidly driven out of business, all over the Mussulman world, by the cheaper products of Western machinery, and the bazaars will soon know him no more. All these things have helped him to maintain his sway. Few travellers have ever accepted his hospitality without liking him, or have contrasted his sober-mindedness and independence with the timid and flattering suavity of his subjects, without at least doubting whether, if he were driven out, it would be possible to substitute for him anything half as good.

If this sketch of the relations of the Mussulmans and Christians of the Empire be true, it will be readily seen that all legislative reforms and all constitutional schemes, such as that recently promulgated, are sure to miscarry, which assume, as they all do assume, the existence, if not of a homogeneous community, at least of a community the majority of whose members only need to have the law on their side to avail themselves of it for the defence of their rights of person and property. The experiment the Turks wish Europe to witness is very like the one we are trying to carry out at the South, in giving the negro a whole arsenal of legal defences against his late master, not one weapon in which he apparently has the courage or skill to use. We give him the ballot, but have to give him with it a military escort to enable him to reach the polls, and put a policeman in his house to enable him to make up his mind calmly and serenely on which side he will cast his vote. To organize his majorities we have to lend him professional politicians from the North, who cheat him, while pretending to serve him. All the constitutional arrangements, now in successful use by civilized peoples, are simply the statements of the terms on which bodies of persons of about equal capacity and courage have, after long conflicts, in which they tested each other's strength and learned mutual respect, at last agreed to live, and carry on a government together. They are, in short, machines, the

motive power of which has to be supplied by the mental and moral condition of the bulk of the people. If this condition is such as that there is no general agreement as to the ends of government, no union of the physical force of the community with its intelligence, and no confidence on the part of the minority in the justice and good faith of the majority, and no general respect for law, a constitution, however carefully framed, is of about as much value for practical purposes as a machinist's working drawing. It shows what might be done, if one had the raw material, skill, and fuel.

There is, however, this difference between the political conditions of the Turkish rayah and that of the Southern negro. The rayah is already possessed of property, and is yearly acquiring a larger and larger proportion of the general wealth. He carries on nearly all the trade of the Empire, and has hereditary habits of industry and economy. He belongs to races which cherish great political memories, and which across the frontier, under rulers of their own faith and blood, are playing a conspicuous part in modern civilization. Moreover, his people live very much to themselves, in villages or communes of their own, and owe to Turkish contempt and dislike of the details of administration long experience in the management of their own affairs. In fact, the Turks have meddled with them but little in a legal way, except to collect taxes in gross, or arrest criminals. Turkish rule has never been, in the ordinary sense of the word, vexatious; what the Christians have had to dread is, not the tormenting interference of the police, as in an over-governed, but the "bull-dosing" and "ku-kluxing" of an ungoverned, country, and the rapacious tax-gathering which is sure to take place when the power which imposes the taxes has no community of interest or feeling with the class which pays them. Consequently the Christians have considerable practice in deliberation, and in the distribution of local burdens, and in concert of action for local objects. What they are most wanting in are physical courage, and the habit of self-defence, and familiarity with the use of arms. They, therefore, do not need "carpet-baggers" to enable them to maintain their rights, but "troops" to give security and to disarm the Turks, and see that there is perfect equality before the law, whatever the law be.

Several years of this security and the appearance on the scene of a generation which has known nothing of Turkish domination

in its worst form, will probably be needed in order to enable the Christians to take a real part in the working of any system of constitutional government in concert with the Turks. But it is quite safe to predict that they will never be called on for any such display of courage or capacity. There is no reason to suppose, even if we concede the sincerity of the official class at Constantinople in issuing the new constitution, that the bulk of the Ottoman population will ever look on it as anything but an ingenious Frankish toy, or a bit of Stamboul corruption, and make any attempt whatever to carry it out. If the proposal of the Powers is adopted, and a sufficient military force is supplied to provide the Christians with equality and security in any particular province, the Mussulmans will probably submit in sullen silence, and gradually withdraw from it, as they have done in times past from Hungary, Servia, and the Roumania, and Besarabia, and Greece, as soon as they can sell or secure compensation for their land. Their numbers have in this way been waning all along the Danube ever since 1829, owing to the widespread belief that sooner or later the *giaours* would in that region get the upper hand. In Bulgaria they are a minority of the population. The Bulgarians proper number about 1,500,000, the Osmanli Turks only about 500,000; but to these have to be added, to obtain the aggregate Mussulman population, about 200,000 Tartars, Circassians, and Albanians, or about 700,000 in all. To the Bulgarians proper have to be added about 110,000 of various other races to obtain the aggregate Christian population, or about 1,600,000 in all, or more than double the Mussulman population. In Bosnia, on the other hand, which includes Herzegovina, the Mussulmans only number 442,000 in a population of 1,216,846, but most of these Mussulmans are found in Bosnia proper, where they form a third of the population, and are all, or nearly all, of Slavonic origin, that is, the descendants of Slavonic converts to Mohammedanism at the time of the Conquest, and, though very fanatical, very hostile to the Stamboul government. Emigration of the Mussulmans from this province is, therefore, not nearly so probable as from Bulgaria, and no easy solution of the problem is to be looked for in that way, and there is no question that any solution of it in Bosnia will need more patience and a greater display of force than in Bulgaria.

That an armed Christian force, not liable to be overawed by the Turks, and feeling military superiority to them, and therefore composed of foreigners, will be absolutely necessary to effect the desired social revolution, there is little doubt. What the country needs above all things is an irresistible and well-officered Christian police, — a fact which Russia has long steadily maintained, and France and England as steadily denied. That Russian sympathy with the Christians has covered motives of a lower order is undoubtedly true, but not less true is it that the Western confidence in the recuperative power of the Turks has also covered fears that were hardly respectable and would not bear full exposition. Whatever danger to England there may be in the appearance of Russia on the shores of the Mediterranean, there has been something monstrous and ignoble in trying to guard against it by upholding an organization so rotten as the Turkish Empire; and now that it is plain that it cannot be upheld by any support from without, English politicians are becoming sensible of the fact that they have allowed Russia to supplant them in the confidence of that portion of the Turkish population which must sooner or later carry on the government, *vice* the Ottomans, deceased or resigned. The English people are not only becoming sensible of this, but also of the fact that in bolstering up Turkey they have been aiding in the perpetuation of the most revolting tyranny of modern times.

The policy of Russia in Eastern Europe differs, and has differed, but little from the British policy in India. In both cases great civilized powers finding themselves in contact with corrupt Asiatic despotisms, have not hesitated to overthrow them, or wrest territory from them, from a variety of motives; the predominating one being undoubtedly, in both cases, love of power, or what it is now the fashion to call the promptings of the imperial spirit. But then the spread of their dominion has brought law and order and security, or, in other words, the basis of all that is good in human society, into the dark places of the earth, the very habitations of cruelty. But no work of this kind, requiring great sacrifices and exertions on the part of great states, could ever be executed if one of its essential conditions was the absence of all selfishness from the design. The forces which carry the race on to its destiny are of all kinds, and come from all sources, and we have to be content if the result on the whole seems to

bring us each year even a little nearer to our ideal. It would seem as if a creed so wholly out of harmony with the needs and aspirations of modern society as the Mohammedan should, as rapidly as possible, have its connection with politics everywhere severed, and be confined exclusively to the spiritual domain. It has many merits, and is doing work in Africa which seems to indicate that it furnishes a more efficacious solvent for the more degrading forms of heathenism than Christianity itself, by rousing a personal pride which to some races is the first step in upward progress. But in Europe and Asia its possession of temporal power is purely mischievous. In the tremendous struggle with a hard lot upon which the civilized world has entered within the present century with so much increase of energy, a creed which preaches the futility of striving is simply an obstacle to be set aside, if not destroyed, with as little ceremony as possible.

EDWIN L. GODKIN.

ART. VII. — CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE.

1. — *X. Doudan. Mélanges et Lettres. Avec une Introduction par M. LE COMTE D'HAUSSONVILLE, et des Notices par MM. DE SACY, CUVILLIER-FLEURY.* 2 Vols. Paris : Calmann Lévy. 1876.

XIMENÈS DOUDAN was a man almost unknown during his lifetime, outside of a circle small in number, but composed of some of the most celebrated of his contemporaries. His life was singularly uneventful, but his immunity from harassing cares and heavy griefs gave him leisure for his favorite literary studies, and his fine nature needed no added guard to save it from luxurious selfishness. He was born at Douai in 1800, and at an early age was left an orphan. He made his way to Paris to complete his education, intending to become a teacher, and while holding a humble tutorship at one of the great Parisian schools already admired by many who were destined to make a mark in the world, he received the position of tutor to the son left by Madame de Staël from her marriage with M. de Rocca. This introduced him in 1826 into the household of the Duc de Broglie, whose wife was a daughter of Madame de Staël by her first marriage, and until his death in 1872 he remained closely connected with this family